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THE ORDINARY HEROISM OF LAWYERS:
A TRIBUTE TO ROGER C. CRAMTON
W. Bradley Wendelt

"One of the consequences of a skeptical age is that all the
heroes are killed off one by one. Law is no exception."'
Roger Cramton was a great defender of the rule of law and
one of the pioneers in the field of legal ethics, in the best sense.
His professional career, as well as his scholarship, demonstrated the qualities of intellectual rigor, courage, and humility
that have inspired me since joining Roger on the faculty of
Cornell Law School in 2004. Students and faculty joke about
the overuse of our school motto, "Lawyers in the Best Sense,"
taken, from a speech by Cornell founder A.D. White. In all seriousness, Roger spent his career writing about, and setting an
example of, what it means to be a lawyer in the best sense. In
many ways, large and small, my thinking about legal ethics has
been influenced by Roger.
I read and admired Roger's scholarship long before coming
to Cornell, beginning when I was a graduate student trying to
work out the right way to understand the relationship between
the role of lawyer and the social and political values served by
the legal system. I was particularly taken by his influential
2
essay, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroon.
Despite its modest length, Ordinary Religion is a remarkably
rich paper-in part an early salvo from the traditionalist camp
in the wars over Critical Legal Studies (CLS), but also radical in
its own way, warning against an uncritical acceptance of the
role of lawyers as "priests of the established order and its modt Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The Author gratefully acknowledges
the research funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for
Legal Research, Established by the William C. and Joyce C. O'Neil Charitable
Trust.
1 Roger C. Cramton, The OrdinaryReligion of the Law School Classroom, 29
J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 259 (1978).
2 Cramton, supra note 1. As of June 28, 2018, HeinOnline reports that this
paper was cited in 227 other works, by a virtual Who's Who of the field of legal
ethics, including Deborah Rhode, David Wilkins, Susan Koniak, Robert Condlin,
Tom Morgan, Steve Pepper, and Carrie Menkel-Meadow. HEINONLINE, https://
www.heinonline.org [https://perma.cc/55QA-NJJ4].

1345

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1346

[Vol. 103:1345

ern dogmas." 3 In places the essay seems to advocate to replace
the values and dispositions inculcated by legal education with
the perspective of an actual religion. Roger laments that transcendence and "a sense of wonder or awe at the inexplicable . . . are off limits for law students and lawyers." 4 But his
views on the role of religion in public life are closer to the
Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr than to the position of a
more radical theologian like Stanley Hauerwas, who emphasizes that a calling to serve God may be incompatible with the
demands of political liberalism. 5 Roger cautions that "[a] desire
for reform is one thing and a good thing: a naive belief in the
creation of a heaven on earth is unreal to the demonic potential
of [human] nature and runs the risk of idolatry." 6 Caution and
humility are required in public policymaking, because "[s]ocial
problems are more intractable than was initially recognized,
and an effective attack on them involves conflicts with other
values."7 No supernatural account of value is required to arrive
at the conclusion that human values are complex, conflicts of
duties are possible, and human experience reveals "the expectation of unavoidable squalor and imperfection, of necessary
disappointments and mixed results, of half success and half
failure." 8
Roger's Ordinary Religion piece is remembered for its observation about the content of the tacit curriculum of legal
education. Contrary to the claim that legal education is evaluatively neutral or amoral, Roger contends that legal education
does inculcate values, but does so implicitly, and what's more,
it teaches crummy values. 'The development of ethical attitudes is probably more affected by the hidden curriculum than
3

Cramton, supra note 1, at 263; see also id. at 254 (criticizing the tendency

of lawyers to see themselves as "apologist[s] and technician[s] for established
institutions and things as they are").

4
5

Id. at 250.
See, e.g., STANLEY

BEHAVE

IF FREEDOM,

HAUERWAS, AFTER CHRISTENDOM?: How THE CHURCH IS TO
JUSTICE, AND A CHRISTIAN NATION ARE BAD IDEAS (1991).

Hauerwas's critique of Niebuhr, simply stated, is that he was so eager to render
Christian ethics acceptable to the wider society that he was inclined to remove all
of the distinctive, peculiar, powerful bits from the Christian message. See STANLEY
HAUERWAS, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, in THE HAUERWAS READER 51,
61 (John Berkman & Michael Cartwright eds., 2001).
6 Cramton, supra note 1, at 258. Cf. ROBIN W. LOVIN, REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND
CHRISTIAN REALISM (1995) (reading Niebuhr as warning Christians in public life

about the danger of the love of power, the desire to reward one's friends and
punish one's enemies, and the limitations of human understanding of universally
valid ideals and norms).
7 Cramton, supra note 1, at 258.
8

STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 170 (1989).
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9
by the formal curriculum," he writes. The hidden curriculum
sometimes encourages CLS-style skepticism with its steady
diet of borderline cases, the perceived arbitrariness of categories and line-drawing, overemphasis on uncertainty and insta0
bility in law, and avoidance of discussions of values.1 Law
teachers also tacitly convey the message that value is a human
creation, and subjective-a matter of will or preference, not a
discovery about the fabric of the universe. Here the target is not
CLS, but law and economics. He writes (referring, I think, to
economic accounts of rationality) that what one asserts as a
reason is nothing more than a "rationalization[ ] for hidden
motives"-brute preferences not subject to rational criticism;
"[r]easons . . . become instruments in the service of warring
preferences."" If there is no genuine reason to prefer one social
policy goal over another, if what purport to be reasons are
nothing more than tricks to sway others to do what is in the
speaker's interests,1 2 then the law's claim to have anything to
do with justice is appropriately met with "[siuspicion, distrust,
and skepticism." 1 3 Even in a legal ethics course, which one
might expect to blunt this tendency toward nihilism, teachers
follow the same tacit curriculum, leading to the charge that law
4
schools teach "legal ethics without the ethics."'
As a legal ethics theorist, I think the conclusions Roger
draws from this argument are half-right. If law students believe
values are purely subjective, the "hired gun" model of lawyering
will have some superficial appeal. To the question, "How do you
come out on this case?" a student learns to answer, "It depends
on what side I'm on." 15 If questions of right and wrong are
really up in the air, what could be wrong with advocating for
the position of someone willing to pay for that advocacy? But a

9
10

11

Cramton, supra note 1, at 253.
Id. at 254-56.

Id. at 259; see also id. at 250 ("Law is not so much an independent influ-

ence on society as a result of social desires and pressures.").
12 Id. at 259. This is, of course, an ancient critique, going back at least to

Plato's attack on rhetoric, as practiced by the sophists, as being the skill of

making the false seem true and the true false. See Plato, Gorgias, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961) (W.D. Woodhead trans.); see also James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow: Persuasion and
Community in Sophocles' Philoctetes, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC
AND POETICS OF THE LAW 3, 3-5 (1985) (arguing that classical rhetoricians have
gotten a bum rap, and in fact they understood that there was a right way and a
wrong way of seeking to persuade others).
13 Cramton, supra note 1, at 259.
14 Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?, 72
FORDHAm L. REv. 333, 340 (2003).
15 Cramton, supranote 1, at 260.
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moment's reflection on the hired gun model shows not only its
instability, but also the implausibility of a theory of values as
relative to each individual's preferences. Roger claims that lawyers are forced into seeing themselves as "intellectual prostitute[s]."1 6 That's certainly not an attractive self-conception.
Lawyers who believe in the traditional ethical obligation of
"zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law" accordingly
emphasize values such as the fiduciary duty of loyalty to clients, the importance of individual autonomy, or the protection
of vulnerable individuals against abuses of state power.1 7 A
lawyer who resolutely defends a client is not a prostitute, but
something noble, such as a champion, a minister, or a friend.' 8
Along the way to refuting that claim that they are no better
than prostitutes, however, lawyers will inevitably make arguments that presuppose the objectivity, or at least intersubjective intelligibility, of values. People have an interest in acting in
ways that can be justified to others. '9 No one wants to be called
a prostitute, so they offer justifications for their actions in
terms that others .can, in principle, accept. 20 The process of
constructing and defending ethical conceptions of professionalism is a performative contradiction of the subjectivity of value.
A lawyer might, instead, wish to conceive of herself as a
"social engineer," working in the interests of society as a whole.
Roger believes this conception of the lawyer's role has a "lifeless, bureaucratic, and technocratic flavor," 2 1 but many of the
traditional models of lawyer professionalism suffer from a tenId. at 259. William Simon famously criticized the standard conception of
legal ethics in which one adopts the interests of another in exchange for money as
closer to prostitution than to the classical ideal of friendship. See William H.
Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 29, 108 (1978).
16

17

See W.

BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW

(2010) (setting out the

standard conception of legal ethics and defending a modified version of it); THOMAS
L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981) (making a complex and
subtle argument, influenced by Stanley Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder, that
the lawyer's professional role is constituted by values and virtues developed
within communities); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) (defending the traditional conception of the lawyer's role with reference
to constitutional values and the importance of checking state power); Stephen L.
Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (relying on autonomy as foundational
value in legal ethics).
18 See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (relying on the value of loyalty
and an analogy with friendship).
19 T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER 154 (1998).
20
Id. at 189-94.
21
Cramton, supranote 1, at 260.
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dency toward grandiosity. Writing in 1934, Supreme Court
Justice Harlan F. Stone urged lawyers to bring to bear their
expertise in "understanding . . . complex facts" and to "use
those facts to envision a new and better community." 2 2 The

Brandeisian ideal of the lawyer as "wise counselor" who does
not merely manipulate legal rules for the benefit of clients, but
nudges powerful individuals and corporations in the direction
of socially responsible behavior, remained a staple of the rhetoric of professionalism well into the twentieth century. 23 At any
rate, Roger's principal concern with the social engineer model
is not that it is boring, but that it instrumentalizes the law. He
criticizes the strand of the tacit curriculum of legal education
which holds that "law is an instrument for achieving social
goals and nothing else." 2 4 It is not immediately clear what
"something else," beyond an instrument for achieving social
goals, the law might be. This ambiguity is cleared up later in
the article, where Roger worries that reason itself has come to
be viewed instrumentally, as a "tool for the control or manipulation of the world." 2 5 In other words, the tacit curriculum
teaches that the law has no intrinsic value.
While he does not say this explicitly, I think Roger's principal concern is that understanding the value of law in instrumental terms creates a temptation to push the law to one side
when it is inconvenient or stands as an obstacle to the realization of one's social policy goals. Roger was rightly proud of
having been fired by Richard Nixon from his position as Assistant Attorney General and head of the Office of Legal Counsel. 2 6 He subsequently wrote, in language that echoes the
critique of Ordinary Religion, that one of the lessons of Watergate is that the "glorification of the president as father figure,
movie idol, and monarch" can lead to abuses of presidential
power. 2 7 (It is not difficult to imagine what he would have
thought about a former reality television star as president.) The
classical antidote to abuses of power is reason and the rule of
22 Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
649, 660-61 (2016) (citing Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48
HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1934)).

23

See Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large

Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 339, 410 (1985).
24
Cramton, supra note 1, at 250.
25 Id. at 261.

26

See Susan P. Koniak, To All Government Lawyers, Roger Left You a Note,

103 CORNELL L. REv. 1329 (2018).
27
Roger C. Cramton, Lessons of Watergate, 2 CORNELL L. SCH. FORUM 6
(1975).
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law. 2 8 In places, Roger's critique of the instrumental perspective on the law is stated too strongly and conflated with a critique of reason itself. He worries that the tacit curriculum of
the law school teaches "a faith in reason and democratic
processes tending toward mere credulity and idolatry." 2 9 There
can be no effective rule of law without faith in reason and the
democratic process. But reading Ordinary Religion alongside
his short article on the lessons of Watergate shows that the
target of his critique is not reason, but the self-importance on
the part of government officials, and the need of ordinary citizens for heroic figures in positions of leadership. He writes:
Instead of viewing President Ford as the quite ordinary, unpretentious, working politician he is, the press devoted itself
to glorifying the mythical super-president in an avalanche of
publicity about dancing parties, poolside picnics, and breakfast muffins. Having created a mythic super-hero, the press
then reacted with violent anger when Ford suddenly took an
action with which most of them disagreed-the pardon of
former President Nixon.
A more down-to-earth view of government and the presidency would not have magnified the euphoria nor been so
crushed by a single action.3 0
The epigraph at the beginning of this paper is therefore highly
ironic, because Roger would presumably approve of killing off
glorified mythical heroes. In order to survive the pressures of a
skeptical age, the law must be an ordinary, unpretentious,
working concept that serves the needs of the political community, rather than becoming an object of worship and mythmaking.
A better, Cramton-inspired "religion" for the law school
classroom would accordingly emphasize humility, fallibility,
and a kind of good-natured skepticism about all human action
that avoids metastasizing into "a corrosive distrust and widespread paranoia that views every public act as the product of
deceit, corruption, or malevolence."3 1 This is quite a tightrope
to walk. We are currently living in a time of widespread distrust
caused-or so I would contend-by the actions of a president
which are infact the products of deceit, corruption, and malevolence. There is nevertheless evidence that the kind of humble,
unpretentious, workaday commitment to the values of legality
28
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV.
1 (2008).
29
Cramton, supra note 1, at 262.
30
Cramton, supra note 27, at 7.

31

Id.
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has proven remarkably effective in the face of a concerted assault upon the independence of the judiciary and executive
branch officials. As Benjamin Wittes observed in a summary of
the first year of Trump's presidency, "the apparatus of democratic rule-of-law governance has held up reasonably well so
far," and that is largely due to the unsung work of rank-and-file
employees of the Justice Department and the F.B.I. and their
commitment to traditional norms. 3 2 Most line-level government
lawyers do not claim to be superheroes; they are just doing a
job that happens to be incredibly important at the moment.
Maybe that's unglamorous and technocratic, certainly as compared with being someone who claims to have an "absolute
right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department,"3 3
but the combined effect of an untold number of lawyers and
judges who enforce the distinction between power and right is
having a vital stabilizing effect at this moment. O.W. Holmes,
Jr. wrote, "I don't see why we shouldn't do our job in the station
in which we were born without waiting for an angel to assure
us that it is the jobbest job in jobdom." 3 4 That is a sentiment
Roger could get behind.

32
Benjamin Wittes, Why Trump's War on the Deep State is Failing-SoFar,
LAwFARE (Jan. 1, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-trumpswar-deep-state-failing/oE2%80%94so-far [https://perma.cc/7LVL-MUTC].
33 See Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry
Makes U.S. "Look Very Bad", N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-mueller-russia-china-north-ko
rea.html [https.//perma.cc/YF2Q-DAK2].
34 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (May 27, 1917), in
The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIsT. IDEAS 3, 10 (1948), quoted in David

Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A CentennialEssay on Holmes's 'The
Path of the Law", 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1549 (1997).

